This paper sets itself the task o~f confronting the pro.mis,e as well as the plight of psychodiagnostics. M.any graduate training programs and clinical agencies, extended p.ortions of the research literature on tests, and a good "many individual psychologists hold testing in limited estee.m. All to.o rarely do the teaching and practice of p,sychodiagnosis measure up to standards of excellence in which one tan take pride. This state of neglect has been used argumentatively by the critics of testing. They say, "You see:, even the practitioners themselves are indifferent to their tests, and given the slightest chance, they escape fro.m this dubious occupation to too.re attractive fields of endeavor, such ,as psychotherapy or research."
biguities of the tester's role ,and in the conflicting values which are tied up with the several components of this role. ~ To begin with, testing is mot a static category. It does not mean the same thing to everyone or in every circumstance. Accordingiy, it seems wise to .distinguish, for inst.ance, between the projective hypothesis, which constitutes the rationale o.f psychodiagnosis, and the multifarious .settings and enterprises in which diagno.stie tests .are used. Depending on whether one thinks of testing primarily as a professional .service, a.s a research tool, as a vehicle for acute clinical insight, or as a teaching device, one associates quite different connotations and values with the term, and, as will be indicated, encounters different value conflicts. For instance, testing as a clinical service requires that the practitioner be well-info.rmed about a variety of no,sologic, therapeutic, and prognostic issues, that he be ,steeped in clinical experience and linguistic as well as practical usage. Ite shoutd know something abeut people and their lives, a.bout varieties of eulturM .organization and experience, about the fountains of mythology, history, art, folklore and mass culture.
One does not master these domains sy,stematically but gains knowledge gradually and interminably. A tester utilizing diagnostic instruments in such a setting and bringing his personal maturity to bear upon them, is likely to develop a rather different regard for tests, for himself, and for the relationship between them, than a worker who. episodically borrows ,a diagnostic device for a circumscribed research purpose. These two exemplary workers maintain rather different viewpoints concerning the usefulness of a given diagnostic test. In a resea.reh program, pragmatic .decisions are reached with #air dispatch through the appli-.cation o.f widely accepted and public criteria, whereas the clinical practitioner is les,s hasty in arriving at convictions concerning the usefulness of a specific test dimension and frequently .applies rather private measuring sticks to the refinement and legitimation of his diagnostic practices. I.f .only in regard to patience and the vMi, dative .criterion, the ~vr o~tl, ooks are ratchet :different.
It is not impossible for o'ne scienti.st-practitioner to use tests for rather divergent purposes .at various t'Lmes mud ordinarily without incurring great inner discord. Nevertheless, the foregoing distinction indicates that elinicM practitioner and research scien-~'Tl~e,se values axe treated in greater detail elsewhere (Rosenwald~ 1963 ).
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PHYBICALISM [ AND PSYCHODIAGNOSIS fist maintain dissimilar expectations and confidence in their tools, epistemological biases, cultivation of skills, and professional values. While some testers stress the rigorous and impersonal up,preach o,f the technician wielding m~cr~o-tools with precision, others emphasize the intuitive interpretation of test findi~ngs with heavy ~tilization o~ their own life experiences and empathic grasp of the tested person's individuality and uniquenes,s. Clinicians in aCademic settings employ test material as a concrete exemplification of abstract ~eneralizations about personality. This orientation de-emphasizes practical decision~making, clinical exigencies and checking up on predictions in favor of .sometimes far-reaching .speculations and trainir~g in characterology. These diverse employments of and attitudes toward the same instruments, often by one and the same wo.rker, probably aggravate the difficulties common to all testing. Even the concrete practices muy differ somewhat depending on whether the tester happens to be wearing the practitioner's, the teacher's, or the researcher's h,at at the moment.
For instance, as a pedagogue and demonstrator he may indulge himself in relatively more venturesome character constructions and concern himself with relatively unpragmatic rubrics of diagnostic assessment. As a researcher, .on the other hand, he will tend to forego even the most tempting procedural deviations from standard practice, and focus on particular variables selected beforehand as relevant to the investigation in progress. As an artist and craftman, he will perhaps bring his own personal sensitivities and insights more freely into the assessment process and into the task of characterization itself. As a member of the mental health team he lgay become involved with the patient in a me.re personal and empathic manner than is usually .allowed for J~ the limited, transient contact of the tester who functio.ns merely as a technician or experimenter. More. of his pers.onal aspir.atio.n~s, central ,sublimations and anxieties ,may be called into play. None of these value-clusters are mutually exclusive or irreconcilable, but it is important to note that identities of individual testers :synthesize their allegiances to one or several of these role models. Consequently, they will not only differ from each other as regards the minutiae o.f practice and formuLution, bat they will al.so ex~p.erience greater or le,s,ser rote-an~d value-conflicts depending on the intricacy and success of their personal syntheses.
It is a commonplace that each professional role of which be,sting partakes is heir to specific as well as overlapping personal gratifications and obstacles. Nevertheless, some writers have discussed testing as though it were an immutable term. To repeat, the definitions of testing are many, and their combinations almost beyond survey. It, therefore, seems profitable to elucidate the ambivaler~ce which may be engendered by each of the several roles which the tester may choose. For instance, where testing is viewed as a routine technical service requested by a hospital psychiatrist and delivered by the psycholo.gist in the form of a standardized laboratory rep.ort, the diagnostician's defenses and attitu,des toward personal pa.ssivity and inconspicuousness will be activated. The tester will be aware that he is only remotely helpful to the patient and is in tenuous contact with his co~lea.gtles in other professions. This aura causes various degrees of suffering or satisfaction to different testers. Where the tester has full ~free-dora, material ,and spiritual support, and access to interesting patients, but where clinical dispositions and management take little account of his findings, the tester's contentment depends on the gratification he provides for himself. A meticulous or somewhat doubt-ridden tester will find this situation agreeable, because no decisions are expected of him. So will a diagnostician who enjoys the exercise of writing reports for no one in particular.
Another example of rote-related conflict, perhaps miniznized when diagnostic devices are used as part of research with anonymous subjects, is the o;pportunity and necessity of gettMg to know the intimate and secret inner life of another person. This function depends on more or less well-regMated voyeuristic impulses in the tester and will therefore evoke reactions of enthusiasm, boredom, perfectionism, or aversion in various testers, de, pending on prsychosexual fixations, preferred defenses and a host of character variables specific to the tester.
As for the tester qua artist, he, too, is s~.scep.tible to culturally supported stereotypes and prejudices. The self-consciousness and s.ocial role of the artist will become part of hi.s self-image.
Perhaps the most conspicuous cause of the tester's professional uncertainty has been his simultaneous loyalty to the artistry of his craft and his participation i,n the scientific values of the larger community of psychologists. On the whole, scientific values have guided the appraisal of diagnostic techniques without much ques-tion. To treat the diagnostician's .claims (for example, "I can tell neurotics froin psychotics in a manner agreeable to the rest of the mental health team") as just another empirical hypothesis (.such as, "Compulsives are mo~re authoritarian than ,hysterics") is, how'ever, mot the only form o.f evaluation under the ,sun. Besides the testing of scientific hypotheses, man's a~tainm.ents may be evaluated in .other ways. The criteria of survival on the market, coinparison with ethical ideals, standards of personal satisfaction and of public relations and welfare come to mind.
Whereas no paradigm seems more relevant to a test of the projective hypothesis than the scientific one, the professional identity of the p sychodiagnosticinn comprises more than a belief in the projective hypothesis; a prof.essional practice is not an empii~ical proposition and ought therefore to be legitimized in some otJher way. This has been generally overl.ooked by Me most voeifero.~s advocat.es of Me hoinely cookho.ok approach. (C'f. Meeh,I, 1956.) The next task i.s, therefore, t.o.e.ons,Lder the application of ph~si.ca~i.s,in,, that is, the langu,age oK p~h~si:ea,t seien~ee, to p:syc~,odiagnostic tasks and to show that while it may be possible, in coo~bo.ok terins, to scr'ambte t~e diagnostic task, the re,s~lt wi]l no.t necessar}ly be edible.
Psychodiagnostics, as we know it today, is f, ar removed from the first efforts made by psychologists and physiologists to explo.re the parameters of fundamental human functions. Originally, interest was focused, not so much on the nnique individuLal, as on the species exemplified by the individual. Problems of sensory receptivity, neural conduction and interference, mental organization, memory and attenti0n were studied by psyc~olo.gisgs long before workers i,n applied psychology adopted their tools, gadgets and conceptualizations for the prediction of academic performance or the formulation of psychiatric diagnosis. One gains the feeling that in large measure the old tools dictated not only the co.ncepts of intelligence and of traits, but in some instauaces, N e psychologist's total view o.f man. After all, how complexly could a psychologist con.ceive of cognitive behavior if he felt that reaction time and other such psychopt~ysical dimensions were the most important components of intelligence? To.day's conceptions are more advanced, but public judginent of current clinical practice often appears to have remained unchanged. It is a critical spirit which is ideo-historically oonditioned and culturally era-bedded. Its appropriateness for modern clinical psychology should, therefore, not be taken for granted.
The early psychometric tool.s were recognizably the physiologist's and the physicist's. The logical conceptions of traits were strictly physiealistie. 'The significance of physiealism for psyehodiaguosties is, therefore, the main fo.eus of this paper. The a speets to be considered are three: disjunetivism, quantifieation, and otigotomy.* DISJIJ~cTIVlS~ To begin with, the simple, as against ~sophistieated, physiealistie language is bound by two traditional laws of tho~:ght: the law of the excluded middle and the law of eontradietion. The first of these proclaims that every particle or object encountered either has a given property or goes not have the given property. The second states that no o.bjeet ean at once have and not have a partieular property.
It is not necessary to enter a metaphysical discussion eoneernin'g the applieability of these laws to the study of man. It seems more to the point that conditions are known in dynamic psychology which are no.t easily suhsuamed under these guiding rules, and that these eondlfio~.s puzzle the physi.ealist A symptom or a drea~ or a Rorsehaeh response may contain aspects of an impulse and of a defense against the impulse. A TAT figure may derive its complexion from several sources in the personality of the patient. The study of the unconscious has inured us to dynamic eonden.s.ations, topographic layerings, symbolizatrions and compromise formations. Common as such observations may be to the clinician, his physiealist-minded colleague feels tempted fo attribute them to the clinician's own muddleheaded thinking.
The applieation of disjunetivism, that is, of the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction, to diagnostic elassifieation entails the foil.owing p.oliey. Once it is agreed that trait,s such a.s obstinacy or suspieiou=sness are relevant to personality assessment, no patient may be elassified as simultaneously obstinate and pliant or simultaneously suspieious and trusting, but every patient must be either o.bstinate or pliant, suspicious or trusting, and generous or envious. That is, of any trait pair (or dimension) at least one value, but never more than one, must be assignable. Sueh a view of man and of assessing him entangles us in great *Descriptive economy.
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difficulties bee a~,se it ignores clinical u~nderstanding and diagnostic e~perience. However, e~en though this physical~,stie model prejudi,ces the question of test validity, it. has a .simple cla.ss~c be~ut.y and wilt, therefore, be enticing to many psychologists.
The realitie,s of testing-p~actiee indicate that .one can say .of any trait that it is present to a certain degree, that it is absent, or that there is no evidence co~aeerning it. Whatever one's attitude toward the abstract proposition that every person is eiNer honest or not, it must not be confused with the practical demand on the tester that he commit himself to the presence o.r absence of the trait of honesty in the ease of any given patient. Neither in eoneeptaa.lizimg nor in measuring personality tan it be assumed that every person will have either a given trait or its .opposite, or that a person cannot exhibit both traits simultaneously.
The methodology of Q-sorting is the chief exhibit of dLsjunetivistie thinking in d2agno.sties. It is a procedure which remains necessarily oblivio~s to the restraints discussed. This makes it more manageable for the statistician, but hardly qualifies it as a scientifically standardized replica of the dia.g~ostieian's daily p~a.ctice.
Fo.r instance, Meehl has implied that given any of his 300 or so. Q-items, and given any patient, one ought to b.e able to rate the patient on the item (Meehl, 1956 (Meehl, , 1959 (Meehl, , 1960 . This is a disjunetiv~stie view. It does not represent the type of description which readers of test reports are ea'ger to receive. An illustration is i~ order here. In analyzing test batteries, the tester may one day hit upon a ease which leads him to state : "This subject strikes me as an honest person," or "This patient thinks women want. to devour him," or "This girl lla.s a Cinderella complex." These charaeterizations .are unusual bt]t they have clinical meaning, and they can be verified ~dep,endently. Yet the tester who has iv one .case drawn such a. sketch would shudder at the suggestion that henceforth he ,state for every patient he encounters t,o what extent he or she has a Cinderella complex, er is honest or .deluded in a .specific Nay.
Me.ehl's own argument applies here: We frequently diagnose traits and dispo.sitions which ha~e low base rates in the population. The caution which follows from this is that we commit o.urselves to the presence .or absence of a trait o~nly where there: is evidence relevant to it.. Of all the traits ever characteristic of people at large, only a small fraction is characteristic (that fs, discernibly present or absent) of one particular person, and of these some may not be indicated in the test protocol. For instance, if we attempt to Q-sort ,a patient on 1,000 items, 950 of these might be objectively irrelevant or inapplicable to his personalit$, and of the 50 which apply, only 25 might be indicated in the tests. Nor should it be assumed that all of the 1,0.0:0 trait, s have the same chance of being applicable to any given patient.
Beyond the well-known fact that many of these traits are correlated with each other in the population at large, there is an issue of contingent relevancy to be t, aken into account. Depending (>n the personality structure we are dealing with, certain traits will not only be predictably present or absent, but the measurement of some will be predictably irrelevant. For instance, in the case of certain deteriorated scl)izophrenics it is not meaningful to inquire into the trait of honesty vs. treachery. Honesty is a disposition which presupposes cognitive differentiation of people bo,th from the self and from each other, anticipation of outcames, memory of promises and commitments, the judgment and concept of moral obligation--~all of which such a patient does not have. He is, therefore, neither honest nor dishonest; this dimension is not applicable to, him.
While this is an extreme example of irrelevance, other less dramatic cases could be cited. The judgment of relevance itself requires clinical sensitivity. Some schizophrenics will be capable of honesty; others will show pseudo-honesty, or rigid delusional self-righteousness. Experience with testing reveMs that patients frequently demonstrate those traits most clearly which are located at the nodal point where important psychic forces intersect. Similarly, it is found that in a great many Rorschach pr, otocol, s there is no salient expression of, say, the patient's body image, bec,atlse the neurosis has not .drawn tha~ p,ortion of the ego deeply i~to the pathology. In that case, it will probably also be clinically unremarkable. In schizophrenic malignancy, body image distortion is ,frequently observed ~bo~h clinically and in tests. Lr~ short, when the level of developmental and/or pathological integration or disintegration is ~o:t c on,s~dered, ~he clinician is likely to, pose inappropriate problems, and the valid, ater is likely to beg the question of test validity.
Although there are very few dimensions of such universal up-
plicability in the field of per:sonality testing that. one oouJ.d ask a tester to. commit himself on them in every patient, there are even fewer dimensions of which the as.sessment is never of consequence. In sum, strict adherence to. the 1,aw of the excluded middle sometimes forces the diagnostician, whether in clinical or validation.al work, to render irrelevant or Procrustean judgments.
As regards the law of contradiction, that no patient can ,simultaneously exhibit a trait and its opposite, this is basic in Q-sort methodology and merits the following objection. In the study of bo.th well-f.unetioning and disturbed personality, it is a common assumption that traits which are logical contraries can well coexist in one person and in one piece of behavior. For in.stance) a student who .asks for extraordinary concessions from a teacher may voice his demands in diffidently mumbled tones. This condensation is not semantic but motivatiorml, and is difficult to disentangle and classify as to purpose and intention. In fact, in certain clinical disorders the simultaneous strivMg for expression of two apparently opposed tendencies may constitute a coaspieuons and defining characteristic. Mutually exclusive motivations and perceptions are conceptualized under the rubric o.f amb ivMence. Not only is the diagnostician not taken aback by such occurrences, but he sets himself the subtle task of specifying the structural ,and functs properties of such a trait-pMr, or trMt-complex. lie determines which member is the more prominent, how aware the patient is of the less prominent one, and the like. A procedure for vMidating tests which does not take such complexities into account will be inadequate.
Even if it were po.ssible to eliminate the drawbacks ,built into the Q-sort method, tests, as they are commonly used, would not always yield perfect descriptions or predictions. One ought, however, not to be too quick to reject the instruments for that reason. How we evaluate the usefulness of projective tests in predicting obstinacy or suspieiollsness cannot be made to depend on experimental designs in which each of 100 patients is assessed with respect to these traits. Neither people nor tests are constructed so as to satisfy thins requirement. Some other procedure is needed to provide an estimate of diagnostic fallibility. It seems a research task of great importance to determine what position in the personality constellation is assumed by those character features which emerge clearly in the tests as a'gainst those which appear vaguely or not at all. There is a widespread, but uncertain, belief that the more ee~ntral the character trait is in the psychic economy of the patient, the more conspicuous its manifestations will be in the test protocol. Yet many experienced testers find that some traits which are very clear in the cl~n@al picture may be only peripherally evident in the tests. Nothing is known about such di,serepancies except that they can be used polemically to discredit the tester. QUA~TIFICATIO~ The wish to quantify psychological traits is the second physical istic trend to be discussed. It bus been widely debated in the literature and will be dealt with only briefly here. Quantification as a heuristic value for psychology probably has its origin in the so-called exact sciences which the physicalistic-minded psychologist takes as his model. Some p.syehologists feel that their field of interest must be subjected to strict metric mathematization in order to take its place among the sciences. Others defer the decision, saying that much of psychology i,s still too young to be amenable to quantification and that it may never 'become amenable.
The appurtenances of testing look appealingly scientific and quantifiable. The diagnostician couches some of his communications in ~umbers, and letter symbols. He performs a f~w impressive calculations. He app.ra~ses the significance of percentages and ratio.s. He is busy with much counting and tallying, and he does not go out of his way to ,minimize the public app.eal os these measurements. Especially if he feels embarrassed about his intuitive i~nferences, he will gain respite in the IQ, the F+%, or in the M: XC ratio. Those experimenters who are forever casting about for a clinical procedure that is amenable to laboratory techniques and to quantitative statement will consider this an invitation, and some diagno,sticians will help to bowdlerize di,agnostic tests; for if such an experiment yields positive results, the diagnostician can point to these documentations of his daily clinical activity, no matter how grossly unrepresentative the experimentM procedures are of what he act,ua]ly does in interpreting ali:nical tests.
It i.s ,a recurrent ~emptation for the ambivalen: tester to ha~d over the more easily communicated of his work habits to the experimenter who will, with good hop.e, render them legitimate with a pithy t-test. Psychodiagaostic methods lo.ok ,s~perficially more objective, rigorous and explicit than they are. Many diagnosticians vindictively underscore these scientific aspects to make their wo.rk more acceptable to th.eir experimental challengers ,and to their own scie~ntific consciences. Ironically eno.ugh, they often vitiate the essence and body of test interpretation in thins sacrifice to Science.
Be that as it may, one should recognize two cautions which this issue entails for diagnostics. The first caution applies to the belief that behavior, as in test responses, can be quantified in more thaw an a d hoc manner while the psychological dimensions which determine the behavior are neither e:&austively charted no.r even crudely conceptualized or interrelated as yet. After all, test observations are supposed to provide information concerning an inner state of the individual, which in turn is a determinant of the behavior we wish to describe or predict. The opportunities for obtaining .meaningful correlation.s between test responses and a characterological dimension are therefore ~o greater than the opportunities for a meaningful quantification of the char.actor dimensi.on itself.
When the physicist measures, he knows the 4imensions of observables as expressed in terms of the .CGS (centimeter, gram, second) system, and when he establishes a constant he knows that its dimension is such as to make his equation not only quantitatively but also dimensionally true. In s ~---(g/2) t 2 the dimension of s is C, of t is S, and of g is C/$2; thus substituting these dimensions, we get C = (C/S 2) S 2, indicating that the equation is dimensionally true. The classic scale of hardness is a means of quantification too. But instead of a dimensional measure, it provides only an ad hoc quantification. Most---if not all measurements (e.g., IQ's) of present-day psychology are ad hoc quantifieations. (Rapaport, 1959.) That is, theoretical analysis is sidestepped in much psychological experhnentation with gro~ss criteria not because it is unnecessary, but because it is t,o,o difficult as yet. To take a hi.storical exa,mple, our understanding of intelligence, its origin, its functions, its vulnerabilities, has been strengthened ~since we de-emphasized the prediction of gross academic achievement measures (for example, graduating from high school) from gross test measures (for instance, total ]~Q) and began, however tentatively, (a) to conceptualize and interrelate co.mpo~aents of intelligence and (,b) to .seek their representation in subscores of the over-all IQ.
So far we do not know how to achieve a dimensional quantification of psychoanalytic variables; and yet we cannot sit with folded hands, since additional observations are needed for the systematization of the theory and for dimensional quantification. Thus in gathering new observations we must be satisfied with ad hoc quantifications, but we must not lose sight of the goal of dimensional quantification. To achieve that, we will have to lealm to consider the locus of our variables in the motivational and structural hierarchy and to play variables against each other so as to arrive at equations which represent actual balance of forces, or balances between structures and forces, etc. (Rapaport, 1959.) The need for this sort of analysis should become especially clear when we consider that our most commonly used tests were not generated from a well-understood model of the mind, but rather in relative independence of what they were later expected to measure. Therefore, to go from the Rorschach to the therapy situation o~e needs to understand not only the l~orschach and the therapy, but also the mechanisms and structures--the dimensions of which Rapaport species--which are thought to mediate the prediction and understanding to be derived from the tests. (In this we see the most promine~at heuristic dissonance between the cookbook approach and that based on clhaical judgment, since the former seems to circumvent the analysis of me,diatii~g mechani,sms.)
The second caution against quantification arises from its relative inflexibility. In the contemporary literature on test validation, one finds rather forcible efforts to squeeze the essence of p erso~l-ality description into ratings by means of brief, non-interrelated Q-sort or check list items. ~Vhile the shortcomings of blind matching are obvious, it does preserve the advantage of verisimilitude. In t~sting practice one does not string" up a series of Q-items. The most cogent reason for not doing so is that personality ,structure is conceived otherwise in dynamic psychology.
For instance, "While the patient is haughty and overtly oppositional toward authority figures who make demands on him, he tends to be acquiescent and even servile when dictated what he is to do 'for his own sake.'" This is a useful piece of description but one which is not easily frugane~ated into t~vo or three brief components. Its significance lies in the ,contrast between the patient's behavior toward demanding and solicitous authorities. Similarly, there is a singular meaning in a tester's admission at the end of the report that a patie~at may at times be de~spondent even though his main argument has been to dismiss depression as a primary symptom.
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A test report is eonfigural in the s.ame sense tha~ a character structure is. One intends to translate the interrelationships, dependencies, contradictions, exceptions, salienees, omissions, equivalences and deceptions of the various psychic and behavioral ele~ ments into their semantic and grammati6 representations.
"The patient'.s aggressiveness is first of ,all the wrath of a person who finds himself abando~ned. This oral hunger becomes supplanted, ho~wever, by an aggression of somewhat different origin, when he finds that his pleas have little effect on the external world. Then aggressiveness serves to mitigate his solitude and his sense of futility and provides him with a sense of his own personal integrity and of his .capacity for emotional experience --a capacity of which he secretly despairs." These sentences by their contiguity indicate not only the subtle change in the meaning of aggression, but also that an observer might easily overlook the one because o~ undue attention to the other. Thus the need for expediently quantified procedures should ~ot take precedence over the need to preserve the most useful products contained in our diagnostic work.
OLIGOTOIVIY
The last physicalistie policy to be discussed is o ligotomy, meaning division into few categories. The physical scientist attempts to pinpoint the facts and processes of interest to him with the greate,st descriptive and terminological economy. The less irrelevant information intrudes into his descriptive scheme, the mote manageable it becomes and the more efficiently he will predict the movement of his particles. ~ Oligotomy, as a methodological value, ~Oligotomy should not be confused with theoretical parsimony. The sciezatist's effort to reduce the descriptive co~nplexity of natural phenomena does not necessarily stem from a conviction that the world is simple, l%ather, this simpti~eation is the joint product of practical, logical and expei~mental considerations. The, artificial isolation of variables is quite proper for scientific theorizatio~ and experimentation. In the co~rse of tlm% the scientist proceeds fron~ the simple to the ~ore complex and requires fewer and fewer higher-order s~atements t,o encompass the large ~at:alogue of data-language facts. ParMmony is~ in other words~ an economy in the conceptual and explanatory seas% wlfile otigotomy refers t.o descriptive economy. S-1% learning theory, for instance, seeks to specify a relatively small number of descriptive varlables which will sufficiently localize and define the animal particles which it studies and wh'ose behavior it attempts to predict. Most clinicians feel that the p,art~cles which they study require u more variegated, that is~ more polytomo.ns~ deainition. That is to sa.y, the tester who is firmly committed to pars~/mondvus explanations of the phenomena o~ character development, structure ~nd dynamics~ may yet feel forced to retain a higMy po~yto,mo~s (or multiple) array o~ descriptive dimemsions. is irapleraented ,by the physieMi.stie-minded psychologist in two ways. The descri~ptive nniverse is attenuated first by omission, and second by red~,ctiou.
Attenuation thrvugh oraission is a disjunetivistic compromise and has already been discussed. The Q-sor*er feel.s forced to omit certain if.eras fro.m the pool, because, no raatt.er how poignantly they may capture the character of .one or .another patient, it is to,o exacting a task to apply them to .everyone he encounters. Other iteras are retained because they are easily applied to most, though by n.o means t.o all, patients. Such a eomproraise Q-pool yields an unsatisfactory evaluation of the spontaneou,s diagno.stic i~ferences made in the e.ourse o.f daily elinieM work. It is undouhtedly common for a diagnostician asses.sing a p,artieular patient to address himself to a trait which has rarely seemed to matter before and which he may discuss only rarely in relation to other patients. That is to say, unusual traits and, more important, eonstellati, ons of traits may ,force themselves on the perceptive ~ester's attention even though ~n.o one asked him to look out fo.r them. The raetlmdotogieM question o.f ,ho.w one can experimentally standardize the practising diagn, ostieian's unlimited descriptive doraain without loMng the benefits arising from such freedom is as yet unarmwered.
Oligotoray is als.o implemented by descriptive reduction. A1-th.o.u'gh the physical ~seientist seek.s to limit his descriptive v0cab-ulary ,as mtmh as possible, effective eli.nical work is not possible if one adheres to. this value. Let us as,surae that a patient's Ror-.schack p,sychogram in.diea.t.e.s an unu.s~aI emphasis o~ S, M and C' responses. An untrained tester might interpret raechanically that M points to ideational activity and 5nternal int,ellectual control, S toward a stubbornly assertive, oppo,sitional or oblique responsiveness, and C' toward mo.ody, depressed or anxio~.s emotionMity. These three separate diagn.ostie statements are too discontinuous, however. With further deliberation and elo.ser empathy, the tester .co.uld add, "The patient is probably sulky." This quMi .ty of .sulkiness expres,ses Mraultaneo,uisly ruminative (M), dejected (C') ,and acel,satory (S) response eoraponents. This condensation of meanings is more lifelike and requires greater creative .synthesis .on the tester'~s part. While the physiealist wo~ld characteristically prefer the discrete components, thereby avoiding the new superfluous category, the clinician must not shy away from the novel integration. His test report becomes in fact more valuable a,s he begins to dispense with dry technical terminology and substitutes more vital categories for it.
In this preference one may observe the collision between a cognitive bias of the physicalist and a practical ambition of the psychodiagao,stfcian. Such collisions cause co,rffusion .and ambivalence. And yet the task of the tester who wants to capture the individuality of the patient is best .served if he enlarges his vocabulary of tr,aits. For all practical purp,o.ses, it is the labels we attach to people which express their uniquenes.s, and thi, s uniqueness is abrogated by reducing such traits as ,sulkiness to the I~orschach experience hal.ante and approach type. The oppo.rtunities f.or uniqueness are derived from the very obvious fact that there are more traits we ea~l attach to people than there are dimensio.ns we can isolate .on the tests themselves. There are only a handful of Ro.rsehach dimensions compared to the nearly limitless d, omain of traits which we utilize in describing our friends, our neighbors and oar patients.
The disc,ussion of tlle previous pages .has been directed at the conflicting values of the psyehodi, agnosti&an. As a. psychological scientist, he is co.remitted to the values which his science ha.s inherited from the physical sciences. As a clinici.an committed to dynamic psychological thinking, he finds himself pulled away from physicalism. The p.syehoanalytic orientation does no.t .only embody an es.s.e~tial vision of human nature--that is, not only a theory of p er.sonality growth and functioning, but also certain methodological and epist, emological directives which can come into .serious conflict with physiealism. It is unfortunate that many individuals who were initially committed to both the science and the profession of the psychologist have found the conflict between these identities unbearable and have either disaG~iated themselves from .one or become unsure of both.
~ U/CIlVIAI~Y
This paper has singled out physicalism, one of several sources of professional ambivalence. Other sources have been mentioned as well. Not all of these conflicting values have comparable origins. Some stem from the vicissitudes of individual character development, others rise out of the history of ideas, a~nd others still are carried forward by the flux of fashion. It is in the nature of pro-fes,sional identity to satisfy many personal as well as social needs and to agree upon them in an implicit contract between the worker and his society.
Values of many different sorts promote the utilizatio~a of diagno~stic tests in clinical, scientific and academic contexts. Other values appear to conflict and present synthetic challenges. For this reason, no oCte circumscribed model vf legitimation can be su~cient. For in,stance, a new testing technique may satisfy physicalistic criteria, but will per;Imps fM1 to attract the most talented and dedicated diagnosticians. As a result, it will disappoint the consumer and fall into neglect and obso.lescence. Cookbook recipes may find favor with a short-order cook bent on producing standardized, if u~exciting, diagnostic fare, but they will be spurned by the self-reliant chef and the discriminating palate.
The reformatory movements we have seen so far have only brought about professional unrest and mediocre practice. The doubts which trammel the testing profession today cannot be dismissed with one stroke. The most pressing busines,s at this t'~me is to scrutinize more carefully what values animate us as psychologists before we chase headlong after alien and factitious ideals. 
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